I thank Nancy Wallace for helpful comments and criticism.
Governance of public corporations: Profits and the public benefit
The period since 1980 has been one of continuous radical reform in the operations of government, and particularly in the involvement of governments in the provision of marketed goods and services such as transport, electricity and water supply. Government departments and statutory boards have been replaced by government-owned corporations which in turn have frequently been privatised or replaced by private contractors.
These and other market-oriented reforms have yielded significant benefits in many cases. In particular, many enterprises have improved their operating efficiency. In recent years, however, the social and economic costs of the radical approach to market-oriented reform adopted since the 1980s have become increasingly apparent, producing a strong adverse reaction in public opinion and a more gradual softening of support for market-oriented reform among policy elites.
In particular, the policy of privatisation, once seen as combining large efficiency benefits with political popularity is now both highly unpopular and widely discredited as an approach to public finance and infrastructure policy.
As a result of these developments it is important to reassess the role and governance of publicly-owned corporations. Corporatisation can no longer be seen simply as a transitional step towards privatisation. However, if privatisation is unacceptable, it cannot be appropriate for a publicly-owned corporation to act, and be managed, in exactly the same way as its private counterparts. It is therefore necessary to consider how the dual objectives of managing a corporation efficiently and profitably, and of promoting a broad conception of the public interest, can be specified, and how systems of governance appropriate for the pursuit of those objectives can be designed.
Government services before market-oriented reform
Before the era of market-oriented reform, governments provided goods and services in two main ways: through government departments directly responsible to a minister, and through a range of statutory authorities. Broadly speaking, services provided without charge and those regarded as core responsibilities of government were mostly provided through government departments. Where goods and services were provided through markets or where a degree of independence from direct political control was considered desirable, statutory authorities were favoured.
This chapter is mainly concerned with the gradual conversion of statutory authorities into government business enterprises. However, an examination the strengths and weakness of the alternative methods of service delivery in the prereform period will assist in understanding the arguments for, and against various options for reform.
Government departments
Under the traditional Westminster system, most government services were provided by government departments, directly responsible to a Minister. In theory, through rarely in Australian practice, Ministers were supposed to take full responsibility for the actions of their departments, and therefore to resign in the event of serious wrongdoing or service failures, even if they were not personally at fault.
The Westminster system was characterised by an extensive system of checks and balances designed principally to prevent misappropriation of public money. These checks and balances included both the responsibility of the Minister to Parliament and the institution of a permanent public service, in place of the system of patronage that had prevailed in the United Kingdom until the 19th Century.
Despite occasional scandals, the departmental system worked fairly well in preventing corruption. However, these outcomes were achieved at the cost of instituting a rule-bound bureaucratic routine. The system did not allow for flexible reactions to changing circumstances, or for what is now called a 'customer focus', responsive to the wishes of the members of the community to whom services were provided. A variety of responses to this problem were developed, the most important of which was the creation of statutory authorities.
The statutory authority model
Statutory authorities were public institutions, established to provide a range of services and to exercise delegated governmental regulatory powers. Day-to-day management was undertaken by an independent board appointed by, and ultimately accountable to, government. Until the recent wave of corporatisation and privatisation, a wide range of services were provided by statutory authorities. A prominent surviving example is the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, which, despite its name, operates as a statutory authority rather than as a government-owned corporation (For example, it does not pay dividends and is not subject to company tax.).
Statutory authorities were often expected to operate in a commercial fashion, but were supposed to pursue fairly broadly defined objectives. For this reason, the boards of statutory authorities usually included representatives of various groups such as employees and consumers ('stakeholders' in the modern jargon) as well as business people appointed for their management skills.
The strengths of the statutory authority model are illustrated by the creation in former Postmaster-General's Department, a section of the public service. The establishment of Telecom Australia and Australia Post was accompanied by a onceoff increase in prices, sufficient to achieve profitability, including a return to capital, and was followed by a period of sustained productivity gains, particularly for Telecom Australia. Butlin, Barnard and Pincus (1982) , which implies that the rate of productivity growth must be fairly close to this value. That is, the conversion from a government department to a statutory authority produced above-normal rates of total factor productivity growth that have not been equalled by subsequent, more radical reforms, such as corporatisation and partial privatisation.
The critique of public service provision
Pressures for reform of government business enterprises arose from a number of sources. First, and most importantly, all Australian governments, and particularly
state governments faced what has been called the fiscal crisis of the state -the conflict between ever-increasing demands for the provision of services and limited capacity to raise additional revenue. In these circumstances, it was more and more difficult to justify financing unprofitable public enterprises. As fiscal pressure tightened, governments demanded steadily higher rates of return from public enterprises. The temptation to make cosmetic improvements to the budget balance sheets through privatisation also increased.
The movement towards market-oriented reform, which became general in the 1980s, was also important. Inefficiencies in publicly provided infrastructure services were seen as obstacles to the development of competitive export industries. It was widely hoped that improvements in the efficiency of transport, electricity and telecommunications systems would enhance exports and reverse the rapid growth in the current account deficit that followed financial deregulation in the early 1980s.
Finally, it is important not to overlook the element of fashion. In the private sector, periods of enthusiasm for 'conglomerate' enterprises undertaking many activities have been succeeded by periods of divestment and downsizing, in which activities previously undertaken in-house are contracted out or separated and sold off. The same fashions make themselves felt in the public sector.
Critics of the departmental and statutory authority models of service provision relied on the concept of 'transparency', which was used to express the idea that government policies should be directed to the achievement of specific, sharply defined objectives, rather than being justified in terms of a broadly-defined notion of the public good. Advocates of transparency sought to clarify the objectives of government agencies, and to require that, if policies were justified in the name of particular objectives, they should be funded out of the relevant budget. The idea of transparency was used to justify the replacement of statutory authorities, whose managers had a general objective of promoting the public interest, with corporatised enterprises, which were directed to maximise profits subject to the satisfaction of specific 'Community Service Obligations' (CSOs).
The other main element of the critique was based on the concepts of public choice theory. Public choice theory was based on the claim that politicians and public servants, like other economic agents, were motivated by self-interest rather than by the desire to promote the public good. In particular, it was argued that bureaucrats would seek to pursue their self-interest by maximising their budgets (Niskanen 1968 ). An important, but usually implicit, assumption in public choice analysis is that the accountability mechanisms of the democratic system, designed to ensure that politicians and bureaucrats pursue the public good, are ineffectual, or at least inadequate.
Conversely, advocates of market-oriented reform generally accepted, somewhat uncritically, the proposition that capital market disciplines such as the possibility of takeover (Manne 1965) resolved the agency problems associated with the separation between ownership and control in large corporations, first noted by Berle and Means (1932) . Hence, it was assumed that the appropriate path for public sector reform was to adopt systems of governance closely approximating those of corporate enterprises with widely dispersed shareholdings.
The reform spectrum
In examining the structural reform of public enterprise, it is useful to consider a range of possible organisations with traditional government departments at one end of the spectrum (say, the left) and private enterprises at the other (say, the right).
From the perspective of advocates of market-oriented reform, the object of reform is to move as far to the right as possible, subject to constraints arising from potential market failures or political restrictions. To develop the idea of a spectrum, consider first a traditional government department, providing services financed by some mixture of taxes and user charges. The quantity and quality of services to be provided, the way in which those services are produced and the charges, if any, to be paid by users are all decided politically, subject to the constraint that, if voters are dissatisfied, they may vote for a change of government.
Under National Competition Policy, such arrangements are considered, prima facie, to be anticompetitive, and governments are required to consider the following range of reform options:
(i) full cost pricing;
(ii) competitive tendering;
(iii) commercialisation; and
Although it is not explicit in National Competition Policy, the most radical reform option is:
(v) privatisation.
and most organisations that have gone through the first four stages have subsequently faced pressure for privatisation. Under the implementation adopted in Queensland, commercialisation is considered the minimum acceptable reform.
Hence, in this paper, attention will be focused on options (iii), (iv) and (v).
Each step along the reform spectrum involves an increase in reliance on profit as the primary guide to management decisions, and a reduction in direct public accountability. These two changes are directly linked: increases in profitability arise precisely because managers are not subject to constraints imposed through public accountability, and are therefore free to manage enterprises so as to increase revenues and reduce costs.
Commercialisation
Commercialisation involves the creation within government,of a business unit which operates on a commercial basis, but is not a separate legal entity. Such business units are expected to have specific financial and non-financial performance targets and autonomous management of day-to-day operations. Moreover, community service obligations are required to be separately identified, costed, funded and monitored, whereas under full-cost pricing it is only necessary to identify as revenue an amount equal to the difference between the cost of providing services and the revenue generated from those services. Performance reporting and monitoring requirements are correspondingly more stringent than under full-cost pricing.
In the absence of specific requirements to the contrary, such as a policy of 'no forced redundancy', a commercialised enterprise will seek to minimise costs, and in particular to employ competitive tendering and contracting wherever reductions in cost can be achieved as a result. Conversely, the day-to-day management autonomy required for commercialisation implies a corresponding loss of accountability and of public control over operations. This process is taken even further through corporatisation.
Corporatisation
In form, corporatisation normally involves the replacement of government agencies or statutory authorities with a corporation operating under the company laws applicable to private corporations but with all the shares (at least initially) owned by the government. In some cases, government-owned corporations may be set up under special legislation differing in some respects from that applicable to private corporations.
An important aspect of corporatisation relates to the payment of company tax.
Corporations owned by the Commonwealth are normally required to pay company tax, while corporations owned by state governments, which are exempt from company tax, are required to make tax-equivalent payments to the state government.
This requirement is aimed at promoting competitive neutrality, an objective made more difficult by the fact that the effective rate of company tax paid by private corporations varies widely, depending on their ownership structure.
The main substantive change associated with corporatisation is the abandonment of the idea that government business enterprises should pursue a social welfare objective. Like private sector managers, the managers of a corporatised public enterprise have a fiduciary obligation to maximise profits. For example, Telstra, an enterprise with majority public ownership proclaims that its objective is 'maximisation of shareholder value'. No reference is made to the provision of telecommunications infrastructure for Australia. If shareholder value could be maximised by selling off the existing telecommunications network to the highest bidder and investing the proceeds in, say, internet services in the United
States, Telstra's managers would be obligated to pursue that course of action, unless it was overridden by government.
Privatisation
When a government enterprise has been corporatised, it is rarely long before calls are heard for its privatisation. On the assumption that external regulation represents a complete solution to problems of monopoly, externality and so on, there is no obvious reason for governments to retain ownership. In addition, it is claimed that privatisation yields financial benefits to governments.
The second argument is not supported by observation of privatisation in a number of developed countries. Assuming that the proceeds of privatisation are used to repay government debt, the resulting savings in interest are rarely sufficient to offset the loss of income (dividends and capital gains) to the public (Quiggin 1995) .
The principal reason is the fact that, for risky investments, the rate of return required by private equity investors is considerably greater than the bond rate, the rate at which the same investors are willing to lend to governments. This 'equity premium' has never been fully explained, but appears to arise, at least in part, from failures in risk-spreading by private capital markets.
...
The reaction against reform
Beginning around the time of the 1989-92 recession, the public reaction against market-oriented economic reform in Australia has gained strength over time. It now seems reasonable to suppose that the era of radical market-oriented reform has ended.
The political success of market-oriented reform during the 1980s was due to a number of factors. These factors included bipartisan political support, the perceived failure, during the 1970s, of Keynesian macroeconomic policies and the social- A third element of the reaction against reform was a renewed demand for socially responsible behavior by business. This demand has been particularly strident with respect to banks and utilitie. However, concern over the capacity of company directors to escape unscathed from corporate failures has reflected more general disillusionment with the private-sector model of corporate governance, based primarily on the concept of shareholder value.
The most obvious impact of the reaction against free-market reform was the effect on the debate over privatisation. By the late 990s, privatisation was seen as the inevitable outcome of the process of reform in the government business enterprise sector. The large-scale privatisations by the Commonwealth Labor government and the Victorian Liberal government were seen by elite commentators as both economic and political successes.
Since then, the advocates of privatisation have suffered a string of political reverses. State elections in New South Wales and Tasmania, fought primarily on the issue of privatisation resulted in landslide victories for the Labor party, which opportunistically returned to its socialist roots after having led the way in privatisation. Reforming governments in Victoria and Queensland were defeated.
The Federal government was forced by resistance in its own ranks to shelve the full privatisation of Telstra.
Towards a Counter-Reformation
Radical reforms are often carried past the point where they command majority support, provoking some form of backlash. Typically, the outcome is not simply a reaction, that is a partial or complete return to the status quo ante, but a 'counterreformation' arising from the interaction between a radical critique of existing institutions and a more sophisticated analysis of the rationale for those institutions provoked by the critique. The Hegelian notion of the dialectic (thesis, antithesis and synthesis) provides a useful framework for interpreting this process.
The reaction against radical market-oriented reform contains significant elements of populist nostalgia for the apparent certainties generated by policies such as tariff protection, particularly represented by the economic program of groups like One Nation. In view of the failure of policies of market-oriented reform to produce economic outcomes comparable to those of the interventionist policy approaches adopted between 1945 and 1970, such nostalgia should not be dismissed.
Nevertheless, a policy based simply on returning to the past is not feasible.
More sophisticated responses to the limitations of market-oriented reform have included a focus on the concepts of human capital, social capital and natural capital as crucial components of social wellbeing and contributors to long-term economic growth.
Although the counter-reform movement remains somewhat inchoate, it is evident that the era of radical market-oriented reform has come to an end. In particular, it now seems unlikely that large-scale privatisation will be a politically feasible policy in the foreseeable future. As a result, questions relating to the governance of publicly-owned enterprise have more than academic interest.
The public benefit
The first requirement for an system of governance is the development of a systematic and rigorous approach to the concept of 'public benefit'. To begin with, it is necessary to determine the scope of the concept. The Competition Principles Agreement, signed as part of the Commonwealth-State agreement on National
Competition Policy outlined the following non-exhaustive set of considerations that were to be taken into account in assessing whether potentially anticompetitive government policies satisfied a 'public benefit text':
Government legislation and policies relating to ecologically sustainable development;
Social welfare and equity considerations including community service obligations;
Government legislation and policies relating to matters such as occupational health and safety, industrial relations and access and equity;
Economic and regional development including employment and investment growth;
The interests of consumers generally or of a class of consumers;
The competitiveness of Australian business; and
The efficient allocation of resources.
The Queensland government has adopted a more detailed set of guidelines for the application of the public benefit test. In particular, the test focuses on a set of 'Government Priority Outcomes' derived from the Charter of Fiscal and Social Responsibility adopted in 1999. Broadly speaking, the list of Government Priority
Outcomes is a restatement of the set of considerations listed in the Competition
Principles agreement, expressed in more political language and with more detailed, though still broad, policy targets. For example, the regional development and employment consideration is restated as two priority objectives: Although there are differences in emphasis, this list is obviously similar in broad terms to that embodied in the Competition Principles Agreement. The problem is to translate these very general descriptions of the public benefit into objectives appropriate for government-owned corporations and governance procedures to ensure that those objectives are pursued.
Objectives

Profit objectives
Government-owned corporations should not be concerned solely with profits.
Nevertheless, the profitability of operations is an important concern for any enterprise. There is, however, no simple and unambiguous definition of profitability, either in the private or the public sector. Among the issues that give rise to special considerations in accounting for government-owned corporations are taxation and capital structure.
Under present arrangements, corporations owned by state governments are not liable to pay company income tax, but make tax equivalent payments to the state.
The object of these payments is to promote competitive neutrality. However, this neutrality is far from perfect, since state governments do not benefit from dividend imputation or from the concessional treatment of capital gains available to individual shareholders.
Among the issues raised by public ownership is the question of whether government-owned corporations should engage in the kinds of tax minimisation strategies that may be employed by private firms, including, in some cases, private competitors. A public interest objective would suggest that government-owned corporations should not dissipate resources in order to reduce tax liabilities. In the context of competitive neutrality, it is then necessary to ensure that privately-owned competitors do not gain an unfair advantage through tax minimisation.
In the context of the Australian federal system, it is also necessary to consider whether state-owned enterprises should take the public interest to be that of the state or that of Australia as a whole. In the former case, corporations owned by state governments may feel justified in taking aggressive action to reduce Commonwealth tax payments.
The issue of capital structure must also be considered. As part of the process of market-oriented reform, government-owned corporations have increasingly adopted capital structures similar to those of comparable private businesses, relying on a mixture of debt and equity funding with ratios depending on the riskiness of cash flows. It has generally been assumed, that both public and private enterprises face the same effective cost of capital.
As was noted in the discussion of privatisation, this assumption is problematic.
The anomalously large risk premium demanded by private investors in equity means, prima facie that the cost of capital for government-owned corporations is lower than that for private corporations. This implies that government-owned corporations should adopt investment criteria with lower hurdle rates than those required by private firms with comparable risk characteristics.
The implications of the special status of government-owned corporations with respect to taxation and the cost of capital are complex and have yet to be fully worked out. However, the simplistic assumption that competitive neutrality is a simple matter of remodelling government-owned corporations to be more like their private counterparts is an inadequate guide to policy.
Accountability
One of the most crucial differences between public and private corporations is that the former are accountable to the public through ministers and the Parliament, while the latter are accountable to shareholders who can exercise their rights through general meetings or the supply of proxies. Neither mechanism is perfect, and each has its strengths and weaknesses.
In view of the low frequency with which decisions of boards are overturned by the votes of shareholders, and with which incumbent directors are defeated in elections, the control exercised by shareholders is effectively that of an exit option.
Dissatisfied shareholders can sell their shares on the market, and, if enough shareholders are dissatisfied, the firm is likely to become a takeover target.
By contrast, the control exercised by voters over government-owned corporations takes the form of voice. In particular, Parliament can inquire into the performance of government-owned corporations and hold responsible ministers to account.
If Parliamentary accountability is to be effective, government-owned corporations need to be more open to scrutiny than their private counterparts. In particular, scope for withholding information on the grounds of commercial confidential must be substantially curtailed.
Accountability has costs, and these must be taken into account in considering the extent to which government-owned corporations are reformed along marketoriented lines. This point may be illustrated by considering the most direct form of accountability, the right of ministers to intervene in the management of governmentowned corporations. To the extent that such corporations are required to pursue social objectives distinct from the objective of maximising profit subject to specified community service obligations, such intervention is necessary and desirable. On the other hand, where ministerial intervention in commercial decisions is driven by short-term political concerns, it is unlikely to be beneficial. Even the possibility of such intervention may constrain the commercial decisions of the corporation.
In cases where the benefits of accountability are less than the costs, more market-oriented reform, from corporatisation to full privatisation, may be justified.
Conversely, competitive neutrality requires that the profitability targets for government-owned corporations should be adjusted to take account of accountability requirements. More importantly, where private firms take over the provision of public services from government-owned corporations they should be subject to the same accountability requirements, including Freedom of Information requirements, that applied previously, unless a specific decision to relax those requirements is made and justified by a public benefit assessment.
Community service obligations
The full-cost pricing model adopted as part of the process of corporatisation does not require that all users be charged full cost. Governments may, if they choose, impose a community service obligation (CSO) under which some users pay less than the costs of the services that they consume. The discounts provided to pensioners for many services, and the requirement for Australia Post to carry letters between any two points in the country for a fixed price, are two examples. The cost of the community service obligation is then included as a payment from the budget to the agency or enterprise providing the service in question.
A more fundamental difficulty with CSOs is the need for an exhaustive specification of the objectives of organisations which have historically been seen as serving the public interest in a generalised fashion. For example, the post office has long played an important role in the life of country towns, over and above the provision of standard letter services to country residents at a uniform rate. The closure or downgrading of the post office is often an important step in the decline and death of small towns. The CSO for Australia Post is specified as requiring the provision of standard letter services, but not the maintenance of a network of country post offices. This amounts in effect to a policy change; the result is to reduce the resources allocated to the objective of maintaining a decentralised population. This may well be a desirable change, but it is not explicitly chosen in the process of specifying CSOs. Thus, while transparency is maintained for the obligations retained by corporatised government business enterprises, it is lost when objectives are abandoned in the process of corporatisation.
CSOs are most satisfactory when applied to pricing policies. There is no significant difficulty in specifying a requirement that certain groups of users should be provided with services free of charge or at a price less than full costs. As observed above, where there is an element of fixed cost, technical difficulties arise in estimating the cost of providing a service to any given individuals. Therefore, tit is difficult to make a precise estimate of the payment that a government should make to offset the cost of a CSO. However, at least in the case of government business enterprises which are wholly publicly owned, exact specification of the cost of CSOs is not critically important, since the payment of the cost of CSOs amounts to little more than the transfer of money from one public pocket to another.
CSOs are a less satisfactory instrument for imposing requirements relating to the nature of services to be provided. The basic problem is that such requirements may be hard to specify in the contractual terms required for a CSO. It is possible, for example, to require that garbage be collected twice a week, but more difficult to require that the garbage collection enterprise should respond sensitively to community concerns about noisy garbage trucks.
There is little value in providing general injunctions of this kind to a corporatised enterprise. In the contest between the clear and unambiguous imperative to maximise profits, and vague instructions to pursue other objectives, profit-maximisation must win. Indeed, it is precisely this sharpening of focus that has been sought under corporatisation. The assumption has been that social objectives should be achieved through external regulation.
Except in the case of easily quantifiable requirements relating to pricing policies and the like, Community Services Obligations are unlikely to have much impact on the behavior of purely-profit oriented corporations. It is therefore necessary to consider governance structures conducive to the effective implementation of CSOs
Governance structures
A variety of suggestions for governance improvements have been raised in the debate over the social responsibilities of private corporations. Two of these, the European system of dual boards and the idea of multiple bottom lines, are particularly relevant to the governance of government-owned corporations.
Multiple bottom lines
There is considerable interest in the idea that corporations should adopt dual (financial and social) or triple (financial, social and environmental) 'bottom lines' or reporting requirements. In the private sector, such ideas face the difficulty that a governance structure based on the issue of voting shares implies that the managers of the enterprise are responsibly primarily (or, in some views, exclusively) to shareholders, whose interest in the enterprise is essentially financial.
This problem does not arise in relation to government-owned corporations.
There are however, numerous practical problems such as the appropriate definition, quantification and measurement of nonfinancial objectives. Initiatives such as the Charter of Fiscal and Social Responsibility represent a step towards the resolution of this problem, but this is an area where much more progress is clearly needed.
It is also necessary to design management systems conducive to the achievement of the objectives implicit in the adoption of a multiple bottom line.
Such management systems must imply a break from the reform initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s which were designed specifically to avoid the perceived drawbacks of institutions with multiple objectives. One possible route is the implementation of a dual-board system
Dual boards
In the system of corporate governance commonly used in English-speaking countries, day-to-day management of a corporation is the responsibility of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). The tasks of determining corporate strategy and overseeing the work of the CEO (with particular emphasis on fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders) is undertaken by a Board of Directors, which normally consists of a mixture of executive and non-executive directors.
In the dual-board system frequently adopted in Germany and other European countries, the responsibilities of strategic planning and oversight are divided between two boards. Strategic issues are addressed by a board consisting mainly or wholly of non-executive directors, which may include representatives of employees or other stakeholders. Oversight of management is in the hands of a board with a strong representation of executive directors. Such a system tends to reduce the capacity of a single individual, usually the CEO, but sometimes the Chairman of the Board of Directors, to dominate the management of the enterprise.
A dual board system would naturally be conducive to the pursuit of multiple formal objectives. Day-to-day management would focus primarily on the achievement of the profitability objective while the directions set out by the strategic board would be designed to ensure that the operations of the enterprise were consistent with its social and environmental responsibilities.
Concluding comments
Until recently, changes in the governance of publicly-owned enterprises could be seen as a move along a spectrum which led inevitably to privatisation. The general rejection of privatisation as a policy, and increasing demands for systems of corporate governance that take account of social interests broader than those encompassed in the maximisation of shareholder value subject to legal and regulatory constraints, have created new challenges for governments and for managers of publicly-owned enterprises.
A creative response to these challenges will require innovations in the formulation and assessment of public benefit objectives and in the governance structures of public institutions and enterprises, including government-owned corporations.
